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I. Introduction

The Constitution increasingly regulates the use of forensic
evidence in criminal cases. This is a remarkable shift. In decades
past, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to provide strong due
process protection against destruction of forensic evidence. 1 The
Court also declined to recognize a clear due process right to
obtain independent defense access to experts. 2 The Court more
recently declined to recognize a freestanding non-procedural due
process right to post-conviction DNA evidence. 3 The Court in
Maryland v. King4 interpreted the Fourth Amendment to permit
broad collection of DNA evidence from arrestees. 5 In contrast, in
recent years, the Court’s series of Confrontation Clause rulings
tightened requirements to present live testimony in the
courtroom. 6 Perhaps of greater significance, I argue, the Court
1. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 59 (1988) (holding that “unless
a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to
preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process
of law”). For a discussion of the Youngblood ruling, see, e.g., Peter
Neufeld, Legal and Ethical Implications of Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations,
35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 639, 646 (2001).
2. See generally Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). See infra Part IV
(discussing defense access to experts and ineffective assistance of counsel); see,
e.g., Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and
the Second Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 CAL. L. REV. 721, 743
(2007) (“The Supreme Court last addressed the constitutional requirements for
expert assistance to indigents in 1985, in Ake v. Oklahoma, in which the Court
recognized only the barest entitlement to expert advice.”).
3. See Brandon L. Garrett, DNA and Due Process, 78 FORDHAM L. REV.
2919, 2925–26 (2010) (explaining that the Ninth Circuit in Osborne v. District
Attorney’s Office, 521 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2008), recognized a due process right to
potential evidence of innocence, grounded in due process rulings such as Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), which entitles a defendant to evidence of
innocence in the State’s custody).
4. 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
5. See id. at 1965 (“The processing of respondent’s DNA sample’s CODIS
loci also did not intrude on his privacy in a way that would make his DNA
identification unconstitutional. Those loci came from noncoding DNA parts that
do not reveal an arrestee’s genetic traits and are unlikely to reveal any private
medical information.”); see also generally Kerry Abrams & Brandon L. Garrett,
DNA and Distrust, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 757 (2016) (discussing constitutional
implications of DNA testing).
6. See generally Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012); Bullcoming v.
New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S.
305, 311 (2009).
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has strengthened the obligations of defense counsel to litigate
forensics, twice underscoring in little-noticed opinions that:
“Criminal cases will arise where the only reasonable and
available defense strategy requires consultation with experts or
introduction of expert evidence.” 7 In this Essay, I describe how
despite decades of missed opportunities to adequately regulate
forensics, in recent rulings the Supreme Court and lower courts
increasingly focus on sound litigation of forensics. In an era of
plea bargaining, the accuracy of forensic analysis depends far less
on cross-examination at trial, and far more on sound lab
techniques, full disclosure of strengths and limitations of forensic
evidence to prosecutors and the defense, and careful litigation.
The Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clauses are
emerging as promising constitutional sources for improved
regulation of forensics, including through ineffective assistance of
counsel and Brady v. Maryland8 rulings focusing on
investigations and plea bargains, as well as the general due
process guarantee of a fair trial.
The changing judicial understanding of the constitutional
significance of forensic evidence in criminal cases may follow from
a new appreciation that forensic evidence is not only increasingly
important in criminal cases, but also that many traditional
forensic techniques lack adequate reliability and validity.
Forensic science has experienced a decade or more of crisis, with
high profile wrongful convictions due to flawed forensics, ongoing
scandals and large-scale audits of scores of crime labs, and
pronouncements by the scientific community that much of what
passes for forensics is unscientific and must be placed on a firmer
research footing. 9 As a result, the “expectations of the legal
7. Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081, 1088 (2014) (quoting Harrington v.
Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 106 (2011)).
8. 373 U.S. 87 (1963).
9. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS
OF THE FORENSIC SCIENCES COMMUNITY, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN
THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 7 (Nat’l Acads. Press 2009) [hereinafter
NAS REPORT] (“With the exception of nuclear DNA analysis, however, no
forensic method has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently,
and with a high degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence
and a specific individual or source.”). See generally BRANDON L. GARRETT,
CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: HOW CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG Ch. 3
(2011).
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community” have changed, and criminals’ lawyers are expected to
litigate potential deficiencies in forensics. 10
In the past, constitutional criminal procedure had little to
say if inaccurate or unreliable forensics were used in criminal
cases. The Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment Confrontation
Clause rulings in the past decade—from Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts 11 to Bullcoming v. New Mexico 12 to Williams v.
Illinois 13—split the Justices and enhanced the Sixth
Amendment’s role in regulating the presentation of forensic
evidence by expert witnesses in criminal courtrooms. 14 However,
the Court’s Confrontation Clause rulings, as critics have pointed
out, do little to strengthen the reliability of forensic evidence used
in criminal cases. The right to cross-examine analysts has limited
practical benefits, where few cases go to trial, and where crossexamination may not uncover underlying flaws in the forensics. 15
One response is that the Constitution simply has little to say and
that regulating forensics must take place in the laboratory,
through improved public policy, basic scientific research, or
improved rules governing scientific evidence in the courtroom. 16
10. See, e.g., Hinton, 134 S. Ct. at 1088 (noting that the merit of an
ineffectiveness claim hinges on the reasonableness of the counsel’s efforts in
light of the totality of the circumstances).
11. 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
12. 564 U.S. 647 (2011).
13. 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012).
14. For scholarly discussion on this point, see, e.g., Jennifer Mnookin &
David Kaye, Confronting Science: Expert Evidence and the Confrontation
Clause, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 101.
15. See Brandon L. Garrett, Constitutional Law and the Law of Evidence,
101 CORNELL L. REV. 57, 112 (2015) (“[W]e do not know whether the Court’s
Confrontation Clause decisions have actually improved the quality of forensics
work in laboratories, and there is every reason to think that they have not.”);
David A. Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 82 (arguing
that the Court’s recent Confrontation Clause cases may divert “judicial and
legislative attention from other, more promising ways to bring meaning to the
Confrontation Clause”).
16. For work examining each of those potential approaches, see generally
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL; supra note 9; Simon A. Cole, Acculturating Forensic
Science: What is ‘Scientific Culture’, and How can Forensic Science Adopt It?, 38
FORDHAM URBAN L. J. 435 (2010); Jennifer L. Mnookin et al., The Need for a
Research Culture in the Forensic Sciences, 58 UCLA L. REV. 725 (2011); Michael
J. Saks & David L. Faigman, Failed Forensics: How Forensic Science Lost Its
Way and How It Might Yet Find It, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 149 (2008).
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Without fully disagreeing with those diagnoses or prescriptions, I
explore how constitution criminal procedure increasingly has
more to say about forensics than ever before, through the Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of defense counsel, as
well as through the Due Process Clause, as it applies to all sides
in a criminal matter, including the prosecution, crime labs, and
the defense.
There has been very little academic discussion of the right to
the assistance of counsel in connection with scientific evidence. 17
The Strickland v. Washington 18 test is flexible and forgiving; it
requires only that counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, within the broad range of
competency in the bar, as well as a showing that this failure
resulted in actual prejudice to the outcome in the defense case. 19
Many of the Supreme Court’s leading Strickland rulings have
concerned very different topics, including the obligations of
defense counsel to adequately prepare mitigation evidence, which
may rely on extensive expert evidence, at the sentencing phase of
capital trials, 20 and most recently, with a focus on defense
obligations during plea bargaining, but not guilt phase expert or
scientific evidence. 21 However, in recent years, the Court has
begun to re-engage with the obligations of defense counsel at the
guilt phase, and with forensic evidence in particular. Lower
courts have also issued prominent rulings recognizing the
importance of defense efforts to litigate forensics, and in Part III,
I explore those rulings in some detail. Still additional rulings
17. For an excellent piece on the topic, see generally Paul C. Giannelli &
Sarah Antonucci, Forensic Experts and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 48 NO.
6 CRIM L. BULLETIN art 8 (2012). See also Brandon L. Garrett, Validating the
Right to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 927, 955 (2013) (noting the need for
research on whether “defense lawyers properly understand expert evidence, or
forensic science evidence—and does the presence of that evidence tend to alter
defense strategies—and if so, how?”).
18. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
19. See id. at 690 (“[A] court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must
judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of the
particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.”).
20. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (“[W]e focus on
whether the investigation supporting counsel’s decision not to introduce
mitigating evidence of Wiggins’ background was itself reasonable.”).
21. See, e.g., generally Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
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expanding the focus to include plea bargaining may further
improve the relevance of the right to the practice of forensics.
This may be part of a larger recognition in the bar and in the
courts that scientific evidence plays a greater role in criminal
cases such that lawyers have an obligation to handle it properly,
which I discuss in Part III of this Essay. In a prior study, I have
found that in cases of DNA exonerees in which invalid,
overstated, or erroneous forensics were presented at trial,
“[d]efense counsel rarely made any objections to the invalid
forensic science testimony in these trials and rarely effectively
cross-examined forensic analysts who provided invalid science
testimony.” 22 Peter Neufeld has commented: “Defense lawyers
generally fail to build a challenge with appropriate witnesses and
new data. Thus, even if inclined to mount a Daubert challenge,
they lack the requisite knowledge and skills, as well as the funds,
to succeed.” 23 Whether defense lawyers will rise to appropriately
rigorous standards due to rulings that occur sporadically and only
through post-conviction challenges that may result in rulings
years or even decades after a conviction, remains to be seen.
In Part IV I turn from ineffective assistance of counsel claims
and forensics to the Due Process Clause, and to four other
constitutional theories that may become more prominent as
attorneys and judges appreciate the importance of forensics in
criminal cases: (1) the general fair trial right under the Due
Process Clause; (2) the right to adequate disclosure of evidence
from the prosecution, or the Brady v. Maryland due process right,
including during plea bargaining; (3) due process rights
concerning fabrication of evidence; and (4) the right to access
expert evidence. I conclude this Essay noting that whether the
defense will receive the discovery and expert assistances it needs
to adequately litigate forensic evidence remains to be seen, and
whether prosecutors and crime labs will be held constitutionally
accountable for failures to accurately convey forensics also
remains to be seen. 24 Nevertheless, the right place for
22. Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science
Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 89 (2009).
23. Peter J. Neufeld, The (Near) Irrelevance of Daubert to Criminal Justice:
And Some Suggestions for Reform, 95:S1 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S107, S110 (2005).
24. Infra Part IV.
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constitutional regulation lies at the intersection between forensic
analysts, police, prosecutors and the defense. That flow of
information through discovery is most readily regulated through
the companion and mutually reinforcing obligations of the
defense to provide effective assistance under the Sixth
Amendment and the obligations of police and prosecutors to
provide exculpatory and impeachment evidence under the Due
Process Clause. How meaningful courts will make those dual
Sixth Amendment and Due Process protections in the years to
come, particularly in the area of plea bargaining, will be a crucial
test of our commitment to accuracy in criminal justice.
II. The Supreme Court, Forensics, and Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel
The case of Joseph Giarratano, the focus of this Symposium,
provides a telling introduction to the problem of forensics
litigation in criminal cases. His case was a capital case, and yet
his trial lawyer mounted a highly ineffectual defense, failing to
challenge any of the guilt phase evidence, including a confession
and forensic evidence, and making a weak effort to offer an
insanity defense in an attempt to avoid the death penalty. 25 This
was 1979, a decade before DNA testing exonerated any
individuals in the United States, and when there was little
scrutiny of traditional forensics or much in the way of research
regarding the limitations of those forensics. On appeal and postconviction, lawyers did not appear to recognize that there was
anything worth challenging regarding the forensic evidence
either.
There were the forensics at trial but there were also the
forensics not presented at trial. Giarratano had confessed to the
murders and later recanted; at the time, crime scene
investigators found bloody shoe prints that did not match his
shoes, but this was not disclosed to the defense. 26 Nor was blood
25. See generally Richard J. Bonnie, Mental Illness, Severe Emotional
Distress and the Death Penalty: Reflections on the Tragic Case of Joe Giarratano,
73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1445 (2016) (describing the details of Giarratano’s
conviction).
26. See June Arney, Joseph M. Giarratano, VIRGINIA-PILOT, June 26, 1994,
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present on the bottom of his boots, or on his clothing, despite
having been detailed not long after the crime, and where the
crime scene was extremely bloody, with one victim having been
brutally stabbed. 27 Serology identified blood group substances
consistent with that of one victim, and intact spermatozoa, but no
DNA testing could be done back in 1979. 28 The crime scene
analysts also found drops of blood on his boot that was Type O,
the same type as one victim, but also shared by much of the
population; moreover, this was the type of the victim who was
strangled, not the victim who was stabbed. 29
The crime scene investigators also collected a large number
of hairs from the body of the victim, all of which, including pubic
hairs, did not match Giarratano, except for one pubic hair which
was said to be “consistent” with his hair. 30 It was neither
originally clear nor developed at trial where these hairs were
located at the crime scene. The analyst was careful to admit on
cross-examination that it is “possible” that another individual
could have had similar hair characteristics to the defendant. 31
The analyst said that hair comparison is “not like the science of
fingerprints,” 32 which in contrast was said to be a matter of
certainty—a statement that a fingerprint analyst would not make
today.
There were seventeen latent fingerprints found at the scene,
but only one was said by a police fingerprint analyst to have been
unequivocally “made by the same person,” meaning Giarratano,
based on a finding of “over 15 to 20 characters of identification.” 33
at A15 (“Since before his trial, a state expert who tested the soles of
Giarratano’s boots had known that they showed no trace of blood, but it took
years for that information and its full implications to reach his defense team.”).
27. See Giarratano v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1064, 1066–67 (1980)
(describing the murders of Toni and Michelle Kline).
28. See id. at 1072 (describing forensic evidence found on one victim’s
body).
29. Transcript of Record at 77, Commonwealth v. Giarratano (May 22,
1979) (explaining that “blood type O was found on the front and left side of the
right boot”).
30. Id. (“One of the question pubic hairs from that item was consistent with
the standard pubic hair sample in race, color and microscopic characteristics.”).
31. Id. at 81.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 34–35.
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Such point systems are no longer in use today. That single print
was found on a closet doorknob in a bedroom unrelated to the
crime. 34 Not only did the fingerprint analyst reach an overstated
conclusion about the single print found to match, but the analyst
never explained the fact that the large number of other prints did
not match. That said, Giarratano had lived in the apartment in
question, so the probative value of such forensics were never
particularly high.
Regardless, the forensics were not challenged at trial by the
defense lawyer, who could have raised such questions—except as
to the shoe print evidence that was not disclosed to the defense.
There was no ineffective assistance of counsel claim raising the
failure to have done so post-conviction, and nor was there a
Brady claim concerning the shoe print evidence, since that
evidence apparently surfaced only after the habeas proceedings
concluded. 35 The focus post-conviction was on Giarratano’s
competency to stand trial and confess and his resulting inability
to communicate with his trial lawyer. 36 Reviewing the federal
habeas petition, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that
his post-conviction lawyers “expressly disavowed any claim of
ineffective representation of counsel at the guilt phase of the
trial.” 37 Forensics were a non-issue, although they served to
corroborate Giarratano’s confession.
Today, such hair comparisons would raise serious questions
because the scientific community has called into question
whether such comparisons can be used to reliability link evidence
to individuals. 38 The FBI—as well as several states and crime
labs—are conducting a national audit of its work in decades of
cases involving hair comparison. 39 To be sure, the analyst in the
34. Arney, supra note 26.
35. Id.
36. See generally Giarratano v. Procunier, 891 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1989);
Bonnie, supra note 25.
37. Giarratano, 891 F.2d at 489.
38. See NAS REPORT, supra note 9, at 160–61 (stating the committee “found
no scientific support for the use of hair comparisons for individualization in the
absence of nuclear DNA”).
39. See FBI Clarifies Reporting on Microscopic Hair Comparisons
Conducted by the Laboratory, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (July 13, 2012),
https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-clarifiesreporting-on-microscopic-hair-comparisons-conducted-by-the-laboratory
(last
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Giarratano case did qualify the conclusions when questioned on
visited Aug. 30, 2016) (“[B]ased on recent cases, the FBI and Department of
Justice are committed to undertaking a review of historical cases that occurred
prior to the regular use of mitochondrial DNA testing to ensure that FBI
testimony at trial properly reflects the bounds of the underlying science.”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Texas Hair Microscopy
Case Review, TEX. FORENSIC SCI. COMM’N, http://www.fsc.texas.gov/texas-hairmicroscopy-case-review (last visited Sept. 14, 2016) (discussing the impact of the
FBI’s review process on Texas case reviews) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review). I note that one academic, Professor David Kaye, has written
an online essay in this law review arguing these revelations should not trouble
us so much, because, after all, hair evidence might still sometimes be “slightly
probative” even if analysts exaggerate its meaning at criminal trials. See
generally David H. Kaye, Ultracrepidarianism in Forensic Science: The Hair
Evidence Debacle, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 227 (2015). The defense
lawyers in those cases would have been thrilled to have known they could crossexamine confident-sounding FBI analysts, telling them that at best their
evidence might be “slightly probative.” Yet Professor Kaye oddly claims hair
examiners did have “some expertise.” Id. at 232. He cited a 2002 FBI study
using mitochondrial DNA tests to check whether visual hair comparisons were
right or wrong. Id. at 242; see also generally Max M. Houck & Bruce Budowle,
Correlation of Microscopic and Mitochondrial DNA Hair Comparisons, 47 J.
FORENSIC SCI. 1 (2002). That study is well known, involved chiefly cases with
known matches to suspects by experienced examiners, and the authors still
found a high false positive rate. Professor Kaye even resuscitated a discredited
Canadian study from the 1970s claiming to generate statistics to be used for
hair comparisons. See Kaye, supra note 39, at 236–37. Now, the goal of the FBI
audit was to uncover scientific errors in criminal cases, and not to conduct an
academic study. While it might be valuable, as Kaye suggests, for academics to
read the FBI coding protocol, or better, what happened in each of these cases to
better understand the full scope of the problem, the most important goal was to
obtain justice for potentially thousands of individuals as expeditiously as
possible.
Professor Kaye also claimed the FBI might have mischaracterized some of the
testimony reviewed. Id. at 247–52. Perhaps he did not read the actual
transcripts. For example, in the case of Santae Tribble, Kaye cites an online
account; having read the actual testimony, one quickly sees the FBI would have
correctly considered it as an example of overstated testimony. The FBI analyst
explained that “[o]nly on very rare occasions” had he ever seen hairs of two
individuals with the same characteristic. Specifically, he concluded that “I found
that these hairs . . . matched in all microscopic characteristics with the head
hair samples submitted to me from Santae Tribble.” Transcript of Record at 70,
73, U.S.A. v. Santae Tribble, No. F 4160-78 (Sup. Ct. D.C., Jan. 17, 1980).
Tribble was sentenced to twenty years to life, and served a twenty-three year
sentence before DNA exonerated him. To condemn the entire field as a “junk
science” seems no exaggeration at all. The National Academy of Sciences in its
landmark report noted that due to evidence of “such high error rates,” and a
lack of “uniform standards,” among other defects, there is “no scientific support
for use of hair comparisons for individualization.” NAS REPORT, supra note 9, at
160–61. The scandal is that such evidence was allowed in court for so long.
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cross-examination; nevertheless, today there would be a concern
whether the underlying technique is simply too error-prone to be
reliably used in court. The fingerprint comparisons, in contrast,
were presented as an absolute identification. Today, a fingerprint
comparison would not be permissibly presented in such a
conclusive fashion. There was also evidence that did not match.
A defense expert might have come to different conclusions or
examined more carefully the evidence that pointed to someone
other than Giarratano.
Today, numerous pieces of this crime scene evidence could be
DNA tested, including the semen samples collected, any saliva
from the bite mark on one victim, potentially the hairs if there is
sufficient genetic material, as well as the drop of blood on the
boot. A recent effort to litigate the issue and locate any such
evidence for testing was not successful, and apparently, the crime
scene evidence was destroyed while the appeal was still pending
in the case. 40 The questions concerning the crime scene evidence
in Giarratano’s case could be more conclusively resolved today.
The development of new forensic technology does not impugn the
work of prosecutors and defense lawyers decades ago, but it
suggests the importance of preservation of crime scene evidence,
and the need for changed science to support new legal remedies.
The sections below explore how the case law surrounding
litigation of forensic evidence has changed in the decades since
Giarratano’s trial.
A. Harrington v. Richter 41
Since the right to effective assistance of counsel is tied to
“reasonableness under prevailing professional norms,” 42 that
right has had to evolve as forensic evidence has played an
increasingly central role in criminal prosecutions. The U.S.
Supreme Court has had to dedicate greater energies to
interpreting how criminal procedure rights affect what
prosecutors and defense attorneys do when they use such
40.
1979).
41.
42.

Virginia Bureau of Forensic Science, Certificate of Analysis, 2 (Feb. 21,
562 U.S. 86 (2011).
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
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evidence. The rulings defining the responsibilities of defense
counsel are highly deferential. In recent years this has gradually
changed, and the Court and lower courts have become less
tolerant of lawyerly ignorance of forensics, perhaps because in the
CSI Era, ignorance of the centrality of forensic evidence, relied
upon heavily by the prosecution in many criminal cases, appears
more like willful blindness.
In Harrington v. Richter—a decision that attracted notice for
its ruling interpreting the federal habeas corpus statute to
broaden its applicability to restrict access to relief on the merits—
when turning to the merits of the inmate’s claim, the Supreme
Court applied its venerable Strickland test to a case involving
blood evidence. 43 Prosecution experts presented blood spatter
analysis and serological testing of a pool of blood found at a
murder scene. 44 The prosecutors argued that a key witness had
stood in the doorway waiting for the police to arrive, and that the
pool of blood belonged in part to him. To support Richter’s
description of the shoot-out, the defense needed to argue that the
blood belonged to the victims and that the shooting occurred
elsewhere within the apartment; yet the defense introduced no
expert evidence to support the theory. The defense attorney
apparently thought that the prosecution would not have any
experts in court, an odd conclusion to have reached in a homicide
case, and given ready law enforcement access to crime lab
analysts. 45 The Supreme Court noted: “Richter’s attorney was
mistaken in thinking the prosecution would not present forensic
testimony.” 46 The defense attorney did not consult any experts
before trial, or put on any evidence at the trial. What could have
been more ineffective than that?

43. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105 (positing the issue as “whether there is
any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential
standard”).
44. See id. at 95 (noting that the prosecution’s serologist testified that “the
blood sample taken near the pool by the bedroom door could be Johnson’s but
not Klein’s”).
45. See id. at 110 (discussing the defense attorney’s mistaken expectation
that the prosecution would not offer expert testimony regarding the forensic
evidence).
46. Id.
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The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit en banc
ruling granting relief on the Sixth Amendment ineffective
assistance of counsel claim in the case, 47 noting, first that “the
prosecution itself did not expect to make that presentation and
had made no preparations for doing so on the eve of trial. For this
reason alone, it is at least debatable whether counsel’s error was
so fundamental as to call the fairness of the trial into doubt.” 48
Was the prosecution’s mid-trial surprise use of forensics
something that reduced the need for the defense to have
investigated the issue? The Court added, “Even if counsel should
have foreseen that the prosecution would offer expert evidence,
Richter would still need to show it was indisputable that
Strickland required his attorney to act upon that knowledge.” 49
Yet the defense attorney had to know that the defendant’s
explanation of how the murder happened would not be credible
without any evidentiary corroboration. What reasonable strategy
would not seek to corroborate the defendant’s story using
forensics?
The Supreme Court did note that forensic evidence will be
crucial in some criminal cases “where the only reasonable and
available defense strategy requires consultation with experts or
introduction of expert evidence, whether [at] pretrial, at trial, or
both.” 50 This was an important first-time statement by the Court
that effectively investigating forensic evidence is increasingly an
important part of what a defense lawyer must do—and that to do
so effectively, a lawyer may need to consult with an expert.
However, the Court added that: “Strickland does not enact
Newton’s third law for the presentation of evidence, requiring for
every prosecution expert an equal and opposite expert from the
defense. . . . In many instances cross-examination will be
sufficient to expose defects in an expert’s presentation.” 51
47. See Richter v. Hickman, 578 F.3d 944, 955 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Counsel’s
decision not to consult any forensic expert in blood evidence before settling upon
a defense strategy that excluded the use of expert testimony, when the defense
so clearly depended upon the source of the pool of blood in the doorway,
indubitably fails to meet Strickland’s standard of care.”).
48. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 110 (2011).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 106.
51. Id. at 111.
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To be sure, the Strickland standard is quite flexible and gives
lawyers “wide latitude” to adopt different strategies. 52 The Court
emphasized that the lawyer in Richter’s case, “represented him
with vigor and conducted a skillful cross-examination,” including
by bringing out how their analysis was performed long after the
crime took place. 53 But when would cross-examination be
“sufficient” to expose such defects? Has the Court put so much
faith in its Confrontation Clause rulings that it believes that
cross-examination can effectively “expose defects,” without
presenting the jury with an expert with a contrary view of the
evidence?
In this case, the defense lawyer did not conduct a meaningful
investigation to assess whether his client’s account was accurate
or could be supported or contradicted by the forensic evidence,
much less make a strategic decision to use cross-examination to
expose the defects. The Court seemed to also be concerned that
retaining an expert might result in uncovering damaging forensic
evidence that was worse than “fruitless” but rather “harmful to
the defense.” 54 The Court added, “there was the possibility that
expert testimony could shift attention to esoteric matters of
forensic science, distract the jury from whether Johnson was
telling the truth, or transform the case into a battle of the
experts.” 55 Finally, the Court emphasized that there was quite a
bit of other evidence of the defendant’s guilt, which might have
“eclipsed” any benefit to presenting a stronger attack on the
forensics. 56
52. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (stating that
due to “the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge
a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance”).
53. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 111.
54. For other lower court rulings making this type of point, see e.g.,
Woodfox v. Cain, 609 F.3d 774, 810–11 (5th Cir. 2010) (explaining that the
defense would have “risked potentially uncovering damaging information
depending on what the retained expert found”).
55. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 108–09 (2011).
56. See id. at 113 (“There was ample basis for the California Supreme
Court to think any real possibility of Richter's being acquitted was eclipsed by
the remaining evidence pointing to guilt.”). Demonstrating the difficulty and
malleability of such analysis, not exactly a proper harmless error analysis, the
Ninth Circuit had very much disagreed, finding “weaknesses in both sides of the
case.” Richter v. Hickman, 578 F.3d 944, 966 (2009).
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This analysis flies in the face of the reality of a criminal trial.
The prosecutor did not think it was irrelevant that the defense
failed to present any affirmative forensic evidence, but rather
highlighted it extensively in closing arguments, openly ridiculing
the defense:
Bob Bell, [the state blood spatter expert,] he’s 22 years as a
blood spatter expert, all that stuff means nothing. Hey,
[defense counsel] says, the blood be here. Bob Bell, hey he’s
wrong, trust me. I am not going to go get an expert. I am not
going to bring somebody in here to tell you because I don’t
need to do it. I will just do it in closing argument. I will just
say it. If you are willing to believe me, hey, that will work. 57

The problem became even more severe when one considers what
defense experts could have said. As the Ninth Circuit described,
the experts that the defendant did retain during the post-trial
habeas litigation would have shown how the serology testimony
was outright inaccurate. 58 The blood types observed actually
“could not exclude the possibility” that the defendant’s blood was
part of the mixture. 59 A seasoned analyst, who had established
the Crime Scene Investigations Unit of the San Francisco Crime
Laboratory provided a separate report concluding that “[t]he lack
of a large number of satellite droplets [sic] surrounding the pool
eliminates the prosecution’s theory,” that the prosecution witness
was standing in the door. 60
Now, the Supreme Court’s analysis of this claim postconviction was highly deferential. The Strickland standard is
designed to make it possible only to reverse trial verdicts only
when very serious lapses by counsel occur, to the prejudice of the
outcome. 61 Often claims regarding inadequate defense litigation
of forensics are not preserved for review. Furthermore, federal
57. Hickman, 578 F.3d at 962 (emphasis in the original).
58. See id. (“Had counsel bothered to conduct the requisite investigation,
his efforts would have been highly productive. On state and federal habeas
review, Richter’s new counsel conducted the investigation that trial counsel had
failed to perform, and with significant effect.”).
59. Id. at 963.
60. Id. at 962–63 (internal citations omitted) (alteration in original).
61. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (“[A]ctual
ineffectiveness claims alleging a deficiency in attorney performance are subject
to a general requirement that the defendant affirmatively prove prejudice.”).
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habeas restrictions on relief are notoriously complex. Perhaps a
more typical outcome was the Court’s ruling in Bradshaw v.
Richey 62 that the Strickland claim, concerning counsel’s failure to
litigate forensic expert evidence by cross-examining state experts
and failing to present competing forensic evidence, was subject to
a procedural default analysis for failure to develop the facts in
state court. 63 The Supreme Court’s Cullen v. Pinholster 64 ruling
makes it particularly difficult to supplement the state habeas
record to, for example, address new scientific or forensic evidence
that the trial lawyer should have uncovered at the time. 65 Despite
those restrictions, the recent Hinton ruling shows how postconviction review can occasionally remedy inadequate defense
forensic lawyering.
B. Kulbicki v. Maryland 66
The Supreme Court issued a per curiam ruling in Kulbicki v.
Maryland in 2015, denying relief on another ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, but this one involved science that had
fundamentally changed since the time of trial, and emphasized
that back in 1995, the defense lawyer could not have been
expected to be aware of the flaws in the forensics. 67 The Maryland
Court of Appeals had granted habeas corpus to a prisoner whose
trial lawyer had failed to challenge an FBI agent’s testimony
about Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis, or CBLA. The FBI
agent did not find an “exact” match but found sufficient similarity
to conclude that the bullet that killed the murder victim came
from Kulbicki’s weapon, and also matched a fragment in his
62. 546 U.S. 74 (2005).
63. See id. at 79 (concluding that the Sixth Circuit erred by failing to first
determine “whether respondent’s procedural default of these subclaims could be
excused by a showing of cause and prejudice or by the need to avoid a
miscarriage of justice”). The Sixth Circuit later concluded that counsel did
provide ineffective assistance. Richey v. Bradshaw, 498 F.3d 344, 364 (6th Cir.
2007).
64. 563 U.S. 170 (2011).
65. See generally id.
66. 136 S. Ct. 2 (2015).
67. Id. at 4 (“[T]here is no reason to believe that a diligent search would
even have discovered the supposedly crucial report.”).
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truck. 68 The problem was that this CBLA bullet analysis was
flawed science. The National Academy of Sciences concluded in a
2004 report that “available data do not support any statement
that a crime bullet came from a particular box of ammunition.” 69
Fundamental flaws in the assumptions and empirical basis for
CBLA analysis led Maryland courts to reject CBLA evidence
fifteen years later and the FBI to itself later disavow and
discontinue use of the technique in 2005. 70
Should Kulbicki’s lawyer have known back in 1995, at the
time of the trial, that this was flawed science? Kulbicki argued
that a report co-authored by the analyst showed how the FBI
analyst had doubts even in 1991 “that the composition of lead in
some bullets was the same as that of lead in other bullets
packaged many months later in a separate box.” 71 The Court
rejected the notion, saying that “At the time of Kulbicki’s trial in
1995, the validity of CBLA was widely accepted, and courts
regularly admitted CBLA evidence until 2003.” 72 Further,
“[g]iven the uncontroversial nature of CBLA at the time of
Kulbicki’s trial,” it would be asking lawyers to “‘go looking for a
needle in a haystack’” to search for such evidence that the
forensics were flawed. 73

68.
69.

Id. at 2.
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT OF
BULLET LEAD ELEMENTAL COMPOSITION COMPARISON, WEIGHING BULLET AND
LEAD EVIDENCE 7 (Nat’l Acads. Press 2004).
70. See FBI Announces Discontinuation of Bullet Lead Examinations, FBI
NAT’L PRESS OFF., (Sept. 1, 2005), https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/pressreleases/fbi-laboratory-announces-discontinuation-of-bullet-lead-examinations
(last visited Aug. 31, 2016) (“The FBI Laboratory today announced that, after
extensive study and consideration, it will no longer conduct the examination of
bullet lead.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
71. Maryland v. Kulbicki, 136 S. Ct. 2, 3 (2015).
72. Id. at 4.
73. Id. (quoting Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 389 (2005)). In Kulbicki,
the Court also misstated the standard as “meaning his errors are ‘so serious’
that he no longer functions as ‘counsel,’ and prejudicial, meaning his errors
deprive the defendant of a fair trial.” Id. at 3 (quoting Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). That description of the Strickland test was, at the
very least, a casual and imprecise one.
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C. Hinton v. Alabama 74

Compare the Court’s ruling in Kulbicki to the 2014 per
curiam opinion in Hinton v. Alabama, another case examining a
lawyer’s failure to adequately develop forensic evidence at trial,
including firearms and tool mark analysis. 75 The outcome was
quite different. In Hinton, a death penalty case, the Court found
the defense lawyer to have been constitutionally ineffective. 76
Hinton was charged with the murder of restaurant managers
during robberies, in which police recovered six bullets from the
robbery scenes. 77 The only evidence was the eyewitness
identification by a restaurant manager in one of the three
robberies, and a connection drawn by a state ballistics expert
between the six bullets, concluding that they were fired from a
gun found at Hinton’s home. 78 The defense lawyer thought that
he could not obtain more than $500 to obtain an expert, although
the trial judge had said that the statute permitted additional
funds, and “if it’s necessary that we go beyond that then I may
check to see if we can.” 79 The statute in Alabama had been
amended the year before the trial to permit funds “for any
expenses reasonably incurred [and] approved in advance by the
trial court.” 80
The defense lawyer did hire an expert, one with poor vision
and poor qualifications. He testified that the revolver was
corroded and could not be compared to any bullet. The expert
admitted that he had only the use of one eye, making it difficult
to see through a forensic microscope. 81 The prosecutor
74. 134 S. Ct. 1081 (2014).
75. See generally id.
76. See id. at 1088 (“The trial attorney’s failure to request additional
funding in order to replace an expert he knew to be inadequate because he
mistakenly believed that he had received all he could get under Alabama law
constituted deficient performance.”).
77. Id. at 1083.
78. See id. (“After analyzing the six bullets fired during the three crimes
and test-firing the revolver, examiners at the State’s Department of Forensic
Sciences concluded that the six bullets had all been fired from the same gun: the
revolver found at Hinton’s house.”).
79. Id. at 1084.
80. ALA. CODE § 15-12-21(d) (1984).
81. See Alabama v. Hinton, 134 S. Ct. 1081, 1085–86 (2014) (“Payne also
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emphasized in closing arguments that there was “no comparison”
between the State’s experienced experts, who both concluded that
all six bullets came from Hinton’s revolver, and their frequent
ballistics expert work “recognized across the state.” 82 Later,
during federal habeas proceedings, new lawyers argued that
Hinton’s trial attorney was ineffective for failing to hire
competent and qualified ballistics experts. The new attorneys
hired three new and highly qualified experts from leading
laboratories, who all concluded that the bullets were not fired
from Hinton’s gun; one of the experts asked that one of the
State’s trial experts show him how he had ever determined that
the bullets could have come from Hinton’s gun, and the State
expert would not cooperate. 83
In Hinton, the Court described the Strickland v. Washington
standard for ineffective assistance of counsel as asking “if his
trial attorney’s performance falls below an objective standard of
reasonableness and if there is a reasonable probability that the
result of the trial would have been different absent the deficient
act or omission.” 84 The Court emphasized counsel’s “ignorance of
a point of law that [was] fundamental to his case combined with
his failure to perform basic research on that point is a
quintessential example of unreasonable performance under
Strickland.” 85
The Supreme Court quoted Richter to underscore and repeat
the proposition that “[c]riminal cases will arise where the only
reasonable and available defense strategy requires consultation
with experts or introduction of expert evidence.” 86 That said, in
another way the ruling was fairly narrow, focusing not on the
failure to hire an insufficiently qualified expert, but rather an
“inexcusable mistake of law,” concerning the failure to
understand “the resources that state law made available” to hire
experts. 87
conceded that he had had difficulty operating the microscope at the state
forensic laboratory and had asked for help from one of the state experts.”).
82. Id. at 1086.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1083.
85. Id. at 1089.
86. Id. at 1088 (internal citations omitted).
87. Alabama v. Hinton, 134 S. Ct. 1081, 1089 (2014).
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Even in Hinton the Supreme Court could have said more to
underscore the obligations of defense counsel—and of prosecutors
to not use unreliable forensics that the defense must then
counter. How many lawyers will admit that their failure to
adequately litigate forensics was due to an outright
misunderstanding of applicable state law? And why would it not
be equally problematic for a lawyer to misunderstand the science,
as in Kulbicki or more prominently in Richter? On remand,
Hinton’s conviction was vacated and he was exonerated. Hinton
later commented: “I shouldn’t have [sat] on death row for thirty
years. All they had to do was to test the gun.” 88
III. Lower Court Rulings on Strickland and Forensics
How has the right to ineffective assistance of counsel been
interpreted in the lower courts? Professor Andrew E. Taslitz
remarked that “the casebooks are filled with instances of lawyers
failing to spot the simplest and most obvious exculpating
evidence in forensic reports.” 89 Lower court rulings denying relief
for failures to adequately litigate forensics are numerous. 90
Obtaining relief post-conviction in any context is rare and
difficult, of course, both for procedural reasons and the difficulty
in raising substantive errors post-trial. However, the right to
ineffective assistance of counsel is the most commonly litigated
right post-conviction, and it most commonly results in relief in
the rare cases in which post-conviction relief is granted. 91 Far
88. Abby Phillip, Alabama Inmate Free After Three Decades on Death Row,
WASH. POST (April 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morningmix/wp/2015/04/03/how-the-case-against-anthony-hinton-on-death-row-for-30years-unraveled/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2016) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
89. Andrew E. Taslitz, Convicting the Guilty, Acquitting the Innocent: The
ABA Takes A Stand, 19 CRIM. JUST. 18 (2005) (citing, e.g., Baylor v. Estelle, 94
F.3d 1321, 1324 (9th Cir. 1996); Troedel v. Wainwright, 667 F. Supp. 1456, 1461
(S.D. Fla. 1986)).
90. See generally Darian B. Taylor, Adequacy of Defense Counsel’s
Representation of Criminal Client—Daubert or Frye Challenge to Expert Witness
or Testimony, 103 A.L.R. 6th 247 (2015).
91. See Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role
in State Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. LAW REV. 791, 811 (2009) (“A claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel in trial or appellate proceedings was raised in
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more often in recent years, one sees courts granting postconviction relief in cases in which the defense failed to adequately
litigate forensics.
A. Failure to Investigate Forensics or Obtain Experts
Outright failures to investigate forensic evidence have most
typically supported the ineffective assistance of counsel claims
that result in relief in the lower courts. Lower courts have
emphasized that the defense was on notice that forensics either
were central to the case, or that that the forensics were in
question. For example, habeas corpus was granted in a case in
which: “The scientific evidence of arson was thus fundamental to
the State’s case. Yet . . . counsel did next to nothing to determine
if the State’s arson conclusion was impervious to attack.” 92 In an
Eighth Circuit case, defense counsel cross-examined a state’s
expert, who then admitted that whether a certain blood type was
on a knife was speculative, but found counsel constitutionally
ineffective for not attempting “to understand the laboratory tests
performed and the inferences that one could logically draw from
the results.” 93 A First Circuit ruling upheld a finding of
ineffectiveness for failing to adequately investigate a “no arson”
defense, despite having visually inspected a fire scene and spoken
with the state’s arson experts. 94 The D.C. Court of Appeals
granted post-conviction relief where the defense failed to call an
expert on the effects of PCP on the eyewitness in the case, noting
that “[p]re-trial consultation with an expert” would have
permitted the defense to form a sound opinion on the question,
about half of the 2,384 noncapital cases the Vanderbilt-NCSC study assessed.”);
Nancy J. King et al., Final Technical Report: Habeas Litigation In U.S. District
Courts: An Empirical Study Of Habeas Corpus Cases Filed By State Prisoners
Under The Antiterrorism And Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, at 28 (2007),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/ grants/219559.pdf (“81.0% (299) of the
capital cases included at least one claim alleging the ineffective assistance of
counsel . . . .”).
92. Richey v. Bradshaw, 498 F.3d 344, 362 (6th Cir. 2007).
93. Driscoll v. Delo, 71 F.3d 701, 709 (8th Cir. 1995).
94. Dugas v. Coplan, 428 F.3d 317, 328 (1st Cir. 2005) (“In essence [the
attorney] ‘abandoned his investigation . . . after having acquired only
rudimentary knowledge of [the issues] from a narrow set of sources.’” (quoting
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003))).
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and there was a probability that such expert evidence would have
made the difference at trial. 95
The concept of what is reasonable performance of counsel and
the concept of materiality and prejudice may be more complex
when the ineffective assistance of counsel analysis focuses on
forensic evidence. Forensic evidence comes in many forms,
analysis can be performed on many types of evidence, and
forensic analysis can involve disciplines of quite variable
probative value, reliability, and accuracy. Forensic evidence may
be relevant to the fundamental question of identity: whether the
defendant was the culprit, a question that may be of central
materiality in a case. Forensic evidence may be relevant to the
cause or manner of death or other features regarding how the
crime was carried out. Forensics may be relevant to the role of
the defendant in a crime. In addition, different forensic analysis
may be of different degrees of reliability and accuracy, and
therefore of different use to the lawyers litigating the case. Where
the forensic analysis was conducted on tangential evidence,
evidence that would be unlikely to produce probative results, or
evidence of uncertain origin or that had been contaminated, the
failure of the defense to pursue further analysis may be entirely
sensible. Without investigation, however, it may be difficult for
the defense to form an opinion on such questions. Further, a
lawyer must be aware of the possible uses that prosecutors might
put forensics at trial, without full awareness of what their
experts might say. Unfortunately, defense lawyers must be aware
that prosecutors may put fairly unreliable forensic evidence on
the stand, and at trial courts have traditionally permitted even
invalid or overstated forensics. Nor may the defense have
meaningful or detailed discovery concerning the nature of the
prosecution forensic analysis, or what conclusions the analyst has
drawn. Given the real uncertainty that may be present and the
accompanying risks, an excess of caution from the defense may be
warranted.
Following the emphasis in the Supreme Court’s rulings, the
outright failure of the defense to consult with an expert and
adequately consider or investigate the possibility of introducing
or challenging the forensics will be weighed particularly heavily
95.

Kigozi v. United States, 55 A.3d 643, 658 (D.C. Cir. 2012).

CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATION

1169

in the ineffective assistance of counsel analysis. 96 The question is
whether the lawyer reasonably decided not to pursue litigating
the forensics. The Ninth Circuit has put it this way: “‘A lawyer
who fails adequately to investigate, and to introduce into
evidence, information that demonstrates his client’s factual
innocence, or that raises sufficient doubts as to that question to
undermine confidence in the verdict, renders deficient
performance.’” 97 Cases also emphasize the situation where
forensic evidence was “obviously vital to the State’s case,” and
where the evidence of guilt was equivocal. 98 In another Ninth
Circuit ruling, the court emphasized: “We have difficulty
understanding how reasonably competent counsel would not
recognize ‘the obvious exculpatory potential of semen evidence in
a sexual assault case.’” 99
Rulings granting relief on ineffective assistance claims
address an expansive range of forensic techniques, including
arson evidence, 100 cell tower evidence, 101 fingerprint evidence, 102
96. See Dugas, 428 F.3d at 328 (explaining that the Court’s focus is on
“whether the investigation supporting the pursuit of the [not arson] defense was
itself reasonable”).
97. Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1112 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Lord
v. Wood, 184 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 1999)). See also Duncan v. Ornoski, 528
F.3d 1222, 1235 (9th Cir. 2008) (granting habeas relief for defense failure to
consult a serologist); Draughon v. Dretke, 427 F.3d 286, 296 (5th Cir. 2005)
(granting a certificate of appealability for failure to call ballistics expert).
98. See Elmore v. Ozmint, 661 F.3d 783, 871–72 (4th Cir. 2011) (explaining
that apart from forensics, the State’s case relied on a witness’s account of a
“spontaneous jailhouse confession,” the defendant’s “guilty demeanor,” and “lack
of a corroborated alibi”).
99. Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1324 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Thomas v.
Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 750 n.2 (9th Cir. 1992)).
100. See Dugas v. Coplan, 428 F.3d 317, 328–29 (1st Cir. 2005) (concluding
that a defense attorney’s “failure to thoroughly investigate the ‘not arson’
defense in this case was constitutionally deficient”).
101. See Roberts v. Howton, 13 F. Supp. 3d 1077, 1103 (D. Or. 2014)
[Counsel’s] assessment of the evidence, and his failure to retain an
expert, was not based upon a reasonable investigation or
understanding of the evidence. Despite the critical importance of the
cell tower evidence, [counsel] failed to take reasonable steps to collect
the relevant data and independently evaluate the reliability of the
Verizon technician’s preliminary analysis before advising his client to
plead guilty to manslaughter.
102. See, e.g., Siehl v. Grace, 561 F.3d 189, 196 (3d Cir. 2009) (concluding
that, because of the importance of the fingerprint evidence in the
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pathology evidence concerning cause of death, 103 and
pharmacological evidence concerning the potentially lethal effects
of morphine. 104 Still additional rulings address failures to retain
experts on the subject of eyewitness identifications. 105 And
additional rulings address the failure to adequately prepare the
expert witness, even when one is retained. 106 Professor Paul
Giannelli has provided a very useful survey of cases finding the
defense inadequate for failure to call experts. 107
Both inculpatory and exculpatory forensics should be
pursued. In a very interesting case, the claim was that the lawyer
should have objected to a forensic expert’s testimony seeking to
minimize the exculpatory lack of forensic evidence, designed to
counter any potential so-called CSI effect; the court said that it
was not unreasonable for the lawyer not to counter or object to
this testimony. 108 A common problem has been that analysts try
Commonwealth’s case, failing to “counter that expected testimony was
ineffective because it effectively admitted that [the defendant] was the
murderer”); Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that
failure to seek the opinion of a fingerprint expert “could have constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel” where the “only evidence was one fingerprint”).
103. See, e.g., Beams v. Chappell, No. 1:10-cv-01429-AWL, 2013 WL
5754938, at *19–20 (E.D. Ca. Oct. 23, 2013) (concluding that where the
prosecution’s case relies on expert testimony regarding the cause of death, “it
was not a reasonable strategy for [counsel] to have failed to consult an expert to
adequately evaluate the prosecution’s evidence . . . .”).
104. See, e.g., Showers v. Beard, 635 F.3d 625, 634 (3d Cir. 2011) (explaining
that “rebuttal testimony from a credible, objective expert witness . . . would have
cast serious doubt on the prosecution’s case and there is a reasonable probability
the outcome would have been different”).
105. See, e.g., Sturgeon v. Quarterman, 615 F. Supp. 2d 546, 568 (S.D. Tex.
2009) (describing defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on
defense counsel’s failure to present testimony from an expert witness on
eyewitness identification).
106. See id. at 572–73 (concluding that counsel’s deficient performance in
preparing an anticipated expert to testify about the unreliability of eyewitness
identifications “demonstrated a constitutional violation of the right to effective
assistance of counsel . . . . ”).
107. See Giannelli, supra note 17, at 5 (providing numerous examples of
cases in which defense attorneys were found ineffective for failing to call experts
in a wide range of subjects, including psychiatry, gunshot residue analysis,
DNA, and handwriting comparison).
108. See Jones v. Warden, Wash. Corr. Ctr., No. 12-1012, 2012 WL 5472553,
at *20 (E.D. La. Sept. 13, 2012) (concluding that failure to object to the expert’s
statements was not an error, but instead that the decision was “sound trial
strategy” and that “[c]ounsel’s professional or tactical judgment is not to be
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to explain away exculpatory evidence, and the standards for
deeming traditional forensics to be excluded have not always
been sufficiently clear. The power of exculpatory evidence can be
quite great, and courts should be far more attentive to the
defense obligation to litigate exculpatory forensics. Instead, some
courts have held that any result of a not-pursued forensic test
might not be exculpatory, or even if it was, it might not have
sufficiently assisted the defense case; to be sure, in some cases,
the forensic technique itself may not have been particularly
probative or likely to obtain a result. 109
Plea bargaining has taken on an increased importance in
ineffective assistance of counsel rulings, as it has come to
dominate criminal practice, and the Supreme Court has
strengthened the obligations of defense counsel during plea
bargaining. 110 We increasingly see rulings regarding the
obligations of counsel to investigate and litigate forensics before
negotiating a guilty plea. In one case, for example, the district
court emphasized that the defendant would not have reasonably
pleaded guilty had she known of the deficiencies in the
prosecution’s cell tower evidence. 111
questioned in hindsight”).
109. See United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 478 (7th Cir. 2005)
(explaining “[t]hat there [i]s no fingerprint evidence mean[s] simply that there
[i]s no fingerprint evidence,” and noting that often it is not possible to develop
latent fingerprints on firearms”); United States v. Gary, 341 F.3d 829, 834 (8th
Cir. 2003) (calling the defendant’s claim regarding lack of fingerprint analysis
“highly speculative”); United States v. Aquino, 54 Fed. App’x 505, 507 (2d Cir.
2002) (rejecting the defendant’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based
on failure to investigate fingerprint evidence); Hunt v. Vasquez, No. 92-16175,
1993 WL 33863, at *3 (9th Cir. Feb. 11, 1993) (noting that “[t]he fact that there
were other fingerprints on the bag” does not prove the defendant’s innocence,
but “merely demonstrates that other persons handled the bag before it was
tested for fingerprints”).
110. See, e.g., Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407–08 (2012) (“[C]riminal
defendants require effective counsel during plea negotiations. ‘Anything
less . . . might deny a defendant’s effective representation by counsel at the only
stage when legal aid and advice would help him.’” (quoting Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964))); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1385 (2012)
(explaining that “[i]n the context of pleas a defendant must show the outcome of
the plea process would have been different with competent advice”).
111. See Roberts v. Howton, 13 F. Supp. 3d 1077, 1103 (D. Or. 2014)
(explaining that “despite the critical importance of the cell tower evidence”
counsel failed to collect data, and evaluate the technician’s preliminary analysis,
and “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient conduct,
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B. Failures to Request Daubert or Frye 112 Hearings

Failures to make Daubert or Frye objections to the
admissibility of an expert are more difficult to prevail upon,
although they should be taken seriously in an era when the
scientific community has recognized that there are important
methodological and reliability-based concerns with a range of
forensic techniques. 113 Lower courts often cite to the difficulty in
succeeding on such a challenge given how widely accepted many
forensic techniques have become in the courts, if not in the
scientific community. While such rulings are not surprising, for
example, in cases involving straightforward forms of DNA
testing, 114 courts have been far more open to such claims in the
context of more troubling forensic techniques. For example, in
2007, the Sixth Circuit granted such a claim in the context of
bite-mark comparison testimony. 115 Similarly, a federal district
judge granted the claim for failure to request a Daubert hearing
petitioner would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial”).
112. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. 1923).
113. See Sowell v. Morgan, No. 1:10-cv-02377, 2011 WL 7404718, at *20–21
(N.D. Ohio Dec. 2, 2011) (finding no ineffectiveness for failure to make a
Daubert objection to gunshot residue expert); Akins v. Kenney, 533 F. Supp. 2d
935, 951 (D. Neb. 2008) (finding no ineffectiveness for failure to bring a Frye
challenge to ballistics expert); Knight v. Walsh, 524 F. Supp. 2d 255, 301
(W.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding no ineffectiveness for not calling a DNA expert where
counsel “extensively” cross-examined the state’s witnesses). For additional
examples in cases involving DNA evidence, see, e.g., Ziegler v. Secretary, DOC,
No. 3:11-cv-1099-J-39JRK, 2014 WL 6608823, at *9–11 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 20,
2014); United States v. Benson, No. 10-269, 2014 WL 4113098, at *2–3 (D. Minn.
Aug. 20, 2014); Van Hodges v. United States, No. 6:12cv322, 2012 WL 6934624,
at *6 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2012); Brown v. Cain, No. CV06-0336 2007 WL
2478762, at *7–8 (W.D. La. Aug. 29, 2007).
114. See Commonwealth v. Avila, 912 N.E.2d 1014, 1033–34 (Mass. 2009)
(concluding that trial counsel was “not ineffective in failing to make a DaubertLanigan challenge to the ballistics testimony” because there is a “dearth of
appellate or indeed any case law” accepting such a challenge); see also People v.
Snell, No. 2-08-0949, 2011 WL 10088352, at *16 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. Jan. 21,
2011) (finding counsel not ineffective for failure to make a Frye challenge to
Shaken Baby Syndrome testimony, finding it generally recognized as
admissible); State v. Leibhart, 662 N.W.2d 618, 628 (Neb. 2003) (same).
115. See Ege v. Yukins, 485 F.3d 364, 379–80 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding that
counsel’s deficient performance constituted cause and prejudice to excuse
procedural default). But see United States v. Bourgeois, No. C-02-CR-216, 2011
WL 1930684, at *93–95 (S.D. Tex. May 19, 2011) (finding any error harmless).
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on arson evidence, where counsel knew there were problems with
the reliability of such evidence, as well as with “extravagant”
testimony from a dog handler who claimed to be able to detect
evidence of arson. 116 The rulings are quite mixed, however. In a
case involving shoe impression comparison, the Sixth Circuit
heavily emphasized how the defense had “labored hard,” although
also emphasizing a substantive view that the evidence itself was
reliable, peer-reviewed, and based on a sound methodology. 117 In
a series of cases involving fingerprint evidence, courts have
similarly held that defense counsel was not ineffective for failure
to request hearings to challenge admissibility of the evidence, in
part because the courts found the evidence to be sufficiently
reliable. 118
Still additional rulings implicate defense failures not just to
challenge the reliability of the evidence through pretrial
hearings, but to ask for relief short of outright exclusion, such as
through motions in limine seeking to limit the scope of the
testimony. For example, a federal district judge granted relief in
a case, noting: “[t]rial counsel never challenged the validity or
reliability of the testimony of [the three witnesses] either prior to
or during the trial, much less called for any limitations on their
testimony even when there were substantial grounds to do so.” 119

116. See United States v. Hebshie, 754 F. Supp. 2d 89, 127 (D. Mass. 2010)
(“[T]o say that the exclusion of either the accelerant laboratory analysis or the
canine evidence would have undermined this verdict and grievously prejudiced
Hebshie, is an understatement. There would have been no case at all.”).
117. See Mahone v. United States, No. 03-93-B-W, 2008 WL 504012, at *4–5
(D. Me. Feb. 20, 2008) (discussing the admissibility of the evidence under
Daubert).
118. See Knight v. Walsh, 524 F. Supp. 2d 255, 298–99 (W.D.N.Y. 2007)
(discussing the evidence supporting the defendant’s conviction); United States v.
Mitchell, Nos. 05-cv-823, 96-cr-407-1, 2007 WL 1521212, at *13 (E.D. Pa. May
21, 2007) (concluding that while defendant’s counsel was deficient for failing to
call experts at trial, there was no prejudice because he did not establish that the
jury would have returned a different verdict but for the error); Li v. Phillips, 358
F. Supp. 2d 135, 142, 145 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (explaining that the evidence against
the petitioner that supported the conviction was “overwhelming”).
119. Hebshie, 754 F. Supp. 2d, at 92–93.
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C. Failures to Cross-Examine Analysts

While the Sixth Amendment rulings by the Supreme Court
emphasize the importance of the defense right to cross-examine
testimonial witnesses, when defense lawyers fail to call witnesses
or engage in meaningful cross-examination at trial given the
opportunity, post-conviction courts are far less concerned with
the benefits of careful cross-examination, and they often view
such decisions as questions of trial strategy. 120 Strickland rulings
regarding failure to call defense experts often emphasize that the
attorney effectively cross-examined the prosecution expert on the
stand and could call into question the forensics in the courtroom
in that way. Yet a series of Strickland cases also deny relief for
the failure to cross-examine prosecution witnesses. For example,
cases have found failure to cross-examine DNA analysts not to be
ineffective, perhaps because of the perception that there would be
little that could be brought out through cross-examination. 121
Failures to question the prosecution expert’s credentials have
occasionally resulted in relief; there have been notorious cases in
which forensic analysts had misstated their qualifications. 122
Other cases link the failure to investigate the forensic evidence
with the subsequent failure to question it through cross120. For a somewhat dated example, see, e.g. Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d
1506, 1512 (11th Cir. 1995) (“Which witnesses, if any, to call, and when to call
them, is the epitome of a strategic decision and it is one that [the courts] will
seldom, if ever, second guess.”) (citing Solomon v. Kemp, 735 F.2d 395, 404 (11th
Cir. 1984)).
121. See Moeller v. Weber, 649 F.3d 839, 846–47 (8th Cir. 2011) (affirming
the South Dakota Supreme Court’s decision that counsel’s failure to cross
examine at the Daubert hearing was trial strategy, and that even if defendant
had won his challenge to a portion of the DNA evidence, there was nothing else
to support excluding any other DNA evidence).
122. See United States v. Williams, 233 F.3d 592, 593 (D.C. Cir. 2000). In a
federal case in Washington D.C., the prosecution expert who determined that
the evidence seized was packaged in the manner that dealers typically utilized,
testified without any defense objection: “I am also a Board-certified pharmacist.
I receive, maintain compound and dispense narcotic, as well as non-narcotic
substances per prescription.” Id. As it turned out, the expert was not a
pharmacist and had no degree in pharmacology; the testimony was perjured. Id.
However, the court concluded that a new trial was not warranted (the claim was
made under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, not ineffective assistance of
counsel) because there was no evidence that the result at a new trial would be
an acquittal, given the difficulty in providing an innocent explanation for
carrying 725 baggies of heroin. Id. at 594–95.
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examination at trial. For example, in an Eighth Circuit case, the
panel concluded that: “At the very least, any reasonable attorney
under the circumstances would study the State’s laboratory report
with sufficient care so that if the prosecution advanced a theory at
trial that was at odds with the serology evidence, the defense would
be in a position to expose it on cross-examination.”123
D. Lack of Prejudice
It is typical in litigation of ineffective assistance of counsel
claims, for courts to find that any failures by counsel did not
prejudice the defense, including by citing to seemingly
“overwhelming” evidence of guilt. This may be particularly true in
situations in which the forensics played a sideline role in a criminal
case. Even where forensics did play an important role, though, some
courts, though, as in Richter, express the concern that retaining
additional experts might hurt the defense, where it is not clear what
additional testing or analysis might uncover. 124 Relatedly, and more
connected to the Strickland standard, courts emphasize the lack of
prejudice for failures to pursue additional forensic testing. 125 And
still additional rulings rely on complex procedural and merits-based
standards that regulate post-conviction litigation, such as the
restrictions imposed by the AEDPA, 126 when they deny relief. 127
123. Driscoll v. Delo, 71 F.3d 701, 709 (8th Cir. 1995).
124. See e.g., Armstrong v. Harry, No. 09-cv-14808, 2012 WL 246247, at *9
(E.D. Mich. Jan. 26, 2012) (concluding that “defense counsel was not ineffective
for failing to call a defense expert witness on fingerprint identification” because
“there was no basis for concluding that a fingerprint expert could have provided
a substantial defense”); Jurbala v. United States, No. 04-94-GMS, 2011 WL
767175, at *6 (D. Del. Feb. 25, 2011) (concluding that there was no prejudice
because Jurbala was unable to identify expert witnesses who could not identify
expert witnesses who would produce rebuttal evidence).
125. See, e.g., Rhoades v. Henry, 598 F.3d 495, 506 (9th Cir. 2010)
(concluding that given the “strong” evidence of the defendant’s guilt, the fact
that more specific DNA testing was not performed to conclusively eliminate the
defendant as a suspect was not prejudicial); Dang v. Lampert, 135 Fed. App’x
13, 14 (9th Cir. 2005) (concluding that defense counsel was not ineffective in
declining to pursue forensic testing because the defendant insisted on going to
trial in thirty days and the test results could have been unfavorable).
126. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104132, 110 Stat. 1214 (2012).
127. See, e.g., Bishop v. Warden, 726 F.3d 1243, 1257–58 (11th Cir. 2013)
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Post-conviction litigation is not an easy way to raise accuracy
objections to trial evidence. Evidentiary errors are not normally
treated as matters of constitutional concern, and the claims that
can be raised in federal habeas corpus proceedings must be
procedurally and factually preserved, with serious constitutional
errors that resulted in real prejudice at trial.
E. Changing Defense and Prosecution Standards
Rulings concerning ineffective assistance of counsel have
long relied on what is reasonable given accepted standards in the
criminal bar. Those standards are changing. It is now well
understood that the defense has an obligation to conduct an
independent factual investigation of the case, and not just rely on
prosecution evidence. 128 Criminal defense organizations
increasingly provide resources and training on forensics issues. 129
The American Bar Association has released new reports on the
importance of careful attention to forensic evidence, and those
recommendations apply to both defense lawyers and
prosecutors. 130 While the Supreme Court’s rulings regarding
(applying the deferential AEDPA standard to conclude that counsel was not
ineffective for failing to present testimony from a blood spatter expert because
the evidence did not reduce the defendant’s involvement in the crime); Williams
v. Thaler, 684 F.3d 597, 605 (5th Cir. 2012) (denying relief under the “highly
deferential” standard of AEDPA because defense counsel’s failure to obtain
reports was not prejudicial); Gentry v. Sinclair, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1185–86
(W.D. Wash. 2009) (denying ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on
failure to argue statistical unreliability of testing because there was no
“manifest error” by the lower court).
128. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005) (“‘It is the duty of the
lawyer to conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case and to
explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of the case and the
penalty in the event of conviction.’” (quoting 1 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE
4-4.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2d ed. 1982 Supp.))).
129. See, e.g., Forensics Resources, NORTH CAROLINA OFFICE OF INDIGENT
DEFENSE SERVICES, http://www.ncids.com/forensic/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2016)
(providing a list of forensic science resources for defense counsel) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
130. See generally AM. BAR ASS’N CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, ACHIEVING
JUSTICE: FREEING THE INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE GUILTY: REPORT OF THE ABA
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION’S AD HOC INNOCENCE COMMITTEE TO ENSURE THE
INTEGRITY OF THE CRIMINAL PROCESS (Paul Giannelli & Myrna Raeder eds.,
2006).

CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATION

1177

effective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining, recognizing
that our criminal justice system “is for the most part a system of
pleas,” have focused on collateral consequences and
communicating plea offers and their consequences to the client, in
the years to come, it will not be at all surprising if the failure to
communicate exculpatory forensic evidence or adequately
investigate during plea negotiations will become the subject of
more right to counsel rulings. 131
These changes in the criminal defense and prosecution bar
could be further cemented in professional standards. Former
federal judge Nancy Gertner has argued that standards for
effective criminal advocacy must change and “the standard with
respect to scientific evidence should be different.” 132 One scholar
has proposed that the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility
be amended to include language that a lawyer must “consider the
need for expert scientific and technical assistance in a case, and
to advise his or her client of this need if one exists.” 133 A federal
judge, Judge Gertner, promulgated a standing order directing
lawyers on both sides to identify and provide disclosures
concerning “trace evidence” issues in criminal cases pre-trial. 134
Such rules should be routine, as should broad disclosure and
discovery of complete files concerning forensic analysis, including
bench notes and lab reports.

131. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (“[P]lea bargains
have become so central to the administration of the criminal justice system that
defense counsel have responsibilities in the plea bargain process,
responsibilities that must be met to render the adequate assistance of counsel
that the Sixth Amendment requires in the criminal process at critical stages.”).
132. Nancy Gertner, Commentary on the Need for a Research Culture in the
Forensic Sciences, 58 UCLA L. REV. 789, 793 (2011).
133. Hannah Jacobs Wiseman, Pro Bono Publico: The Growing Need for
Expert Aid, 60 S.C. L. REV. 494, 540 (2008).
134. See generally Procedural Order: Trace Evidence 1 (D. Mass. Mar. 2010),
http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/boston/pdf/ProcOrderTraceEvidenceUPDATE.pdf.
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IV. Due Process and Forensic Science
A. The Right to a Fair Trial

While the admissibility of evidence is primarily a matter of
state law, the Supreme Court has long held that in narrow
circumstances, if a trial error “so infect[s] the entire trial” as to
deny fundamental fairness, a due process claim may lie. 135 The
Third Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have held that flawed
forensic testimony can violate the Due Process Clause if the
petitioner can show that the testimony “undermined the
fundamental fairness of the entire trial.” 136 In the Third Circuit
case, Lee v. Superintendent, 137 the court emphasized that the
district court had found that the testimony by a fire expert
“undermined the fundamental fairness of the entire trial” because
the “verdict . . . rest[ed] almost entirely upon scientific pillars
which have now eroded.” 138 The various indicia of arson relied
upon at a trial held in 1990 were no longer supported by science,
including failure to do independent chemical testing to assess
whether there was an accelerate, and the lack of any signs that
there were the “more than 60 gallons of gas and fuel oil” that the
expert had testified caused the fire. 139 In such cases, the courts
reasoned that the claim was distinct from a new evidence of
innocence claim, since the evidence was not proof of innocence,
135. Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973); see also Henderson v.
Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977) (citing Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 151, 147
(1973)); Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642–43 (1974) (same). The
Court has stated that it has “defined the category of infractions that violate
‘fundamental fairness’ very narrowly.” Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342,
352 (1990).
136. Lee v. Superintendent, 798 F.3d 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Lee v.
Glunt, 667 F.3d 397, 403 (3d Cir. 2012)); see also Giminez v. Ochoa, 821 F.3d
1136, 1145 (9th Cir. 2016) (“We join the Third Circuit in recognizing that habeas
petitioners can allege a constitutional violation from the introduction of flawed
expert testimony at trial if they show that the introduction of this evidence
‘undermined the fundamental fairness of the entire trial.’” (quoting Lee v.
Superintendent, 798 F.3d 159, 162 (2015))).
137. 798 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2015).
138. Lee v. Tennis, No. 4:08-CV-1972, 2014 WL 3894306, at *15–16 (M.D.
Pa. June 13, 2014). The Third Circuit had earlier remanded the case for further
hearings. Lee v. Glunt, 667 F.3d 397, 403–04 & 403 n.5, (3d Cir. 2012)
(remanding for additional discovery).
139. Lee, 798 F.3d at 167 (quoting Lee, 2014 WL 3894306, at *7).
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but rather undercut the validity of the scientific expert testimony.
On that reasoning, where the forensic evidence was central
evidence at trial, and new scientific research shows that it was
erroneous, a due process claim may be brought on that general
fundamental fairness theory.
B. Brady and Forensics
The constitutional regulation of forensic science could be
buttressed if the right to effective assistance of counsel were
better tied to due process rulings regarding discovery in the
criminal process. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
the police and prosecutors, together, have a Brady v. Maryland
obligation to provide the defense with exculpatory and
impeachment evidence. 140 This obligation is both longstanding
and underdeveloped in the context of forensic evidence. 141 One
explanation may be the separation between not just prosecutors
and law enforcement, but also between both prosecutors and law
enforcement, and then the crime laboratories that often conduct
the forensic analysis. Some courts have ruled that the relevant or
material information that must be conveyed from the lab to the
prosecutor is the result of the analysis, and not the underlying
140. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“We now hold that the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”).
141. See Paul C. Giannelli, Criminal Discovery, Scientific Evidence, and
DNA, 44 VAND. L. REV. 791, 809 (1991) (discussing limitations on discovery of
reports and bench notes); Paul C. Giannelli, Bench Notes & Lab Reports, 22
CRIM. JUST., 50, 50–51 (Summer 2007) (discussing issues surrounding the
failure to produce forensic bench notes containing potentially exculpatory
evidence in discovery); see also 2 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 11-2.1(a)(iv)
CMT. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2d ed. 1980 & Supp. 1986) (discussing disclosure of forensic
experts’ materials); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DNA EVIDENCE 164.1 at 81 (AM. BAR ASS’N 3d ed. 2007) (recommending disclosure of laboratory
case notes); FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee’s note to 1974 amendment
(stating that term “any results or reports” should be given liberal
interpretation); United States v. Penix, 516 F. Supp. 248, 254–55 (W.D. Okla.
1981) (granting in part, defendant’s motion for discovery under Brady v.
Maryland). For examples of cases involving failure to disclose ballistics dating
back decades, see Jay M. Zitter, Failure of State Prosecutor to Disclose
Exculpatory Ballistic Evidence as Violating Due Process, 95 A.L.R. 5th 611
(2002).
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methods and files that might shed light on any weaknesses or
outright flaws in the analysis, although other courts disagree and
require that all underlying reports of tests or procedures used
must be provided as well, and the American Bar Association
similarly counsels that full documentation be provided. 142 This
split in approaches is in contrast to the emphasis in
Confrontation Clause rulings on the provision of testimony from
the expert who conducted the analysis, and not just the bare
certificate reporting the result. 143 Moreover, regarding Giglio 144
impeachment information, still additional information must be
provided regarding the credentials, proficiency, and standard
operating procedures that the analysts were supposed to have
followed in the laboratory, together with the file permitting one to
discern if they were in fact followed. Absent complete discovery
on such matters, prosecutors cannot fully comply with their
constitutional obligations.

142. See, e.g., United States v. Iglesias, 881 F.2d 1519, 1523–24 (9th Cir.
1989) (acknowledging that although internal lab notes “would allow Iglesias to
provide a more effective defense, the government is under no legal duty under
Rule 16(a)(1)(D) to turn over such informal internal documents”); Spencer v.
Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 785, 791 (Va. 1989) (concluding that Rule 3A:11
does not require disclosure of internal documents made in connection with the
case and that due process does not require discovery); United States v. Berry,
636 F.2d 1075, 1082 (5th Cir. 1981) (concluding that experts’ “personal work
notes” are not required to be disclosed under Rule 16(a)(1)). But see State v.
Cunningham, 423 S.E.2d 802, 807–08 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) (ruling that state law
“must be construed as entitling a criminal defendant to pretrial discovery of not
only conclusory laboratory reports, but also of any tests performed or procedures
utilized by chemists to reach such conclusions”); State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d
422, 427 (Minn. 1989) (“[F]air trial and due process rights are implicated when
data relied upon by a laboratory in performing tests are not available to the
opposing party for review and cross examination.”); State v. Burgess, 482 So. 2d
651, 653 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (“Fundamental fairness and due process require
that the defense be given the opportunity, prior to trial, to examine the basis
from which an expert reaches his conclusion.”). For civil Brady case denying
relief where the underlying lab notes would have disclosed that evidence could
have been DNA tested to prevent a wrongful conviction, see Villasana v.
Wilhoit, 368 F.3d 976, 977–78 (8th Cir. 2004).
143. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 318 (2009) (“[T]he
analyst who provides false results may, under oath in open court, reconsider his
false testimony . . . . the prospect of confrontation will deter fraudulent analysis
in the first place.”) (citation omitted).
144. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
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In a leading case regarding the Brady obligations of
prosecutors, the Supreme Court in Connick v. Thompson 145
declined to impose civil liability on an entire prosecutor’s office
for failure to train and supervise officers on those obligations, in a
case in which exculpatory blood evidence was outright concealed
from the defense, leading to the wrongful conviction of a man for
murder. 146 That said, Connick was a civil case seeking municipal
liability. Criminal cases may increasingly litigate Brady claims
concerning concealed forensics. Indeed, entire crime labs have
been besieged by systemic litigation concerning lab scandals. 147
Jurisdictions may improve criminal discovery not just to satisfy
due process obligations but also to avert costly and protracted
systemic audits and litigation. Systemic Brady deficiencies could
be averted by a careful interpretation of Brady to apply to full-file
discovery of forensic evidence; even if Brady does not require
open-file discovery generally, the entire file may be necessary to
understand what the forensic analysis consisted of, and not just
the bare result.
The obligations to disclose potentially exculpatory forensic
evidence, together with impeachment evidence related to the
work of forensic analysts, during plea bargaining will hopefully
also be strengthened in the years ahead. It remains unclear
under the Supreme Court’s ruling in Ruiz, 148 the extent to which
prosecutors must supply exculpatory evidence during plea
bargaining. 149 A system of plea bargaining in which exculpatory
145. 563 U.S. 51 (2011).
146. Id. at 68 (“We do not assume that prosecutors will always make correct
Brady decisions or that guidance regarding specific Brady questions would not
assist prosecutors. But showing merely that additional training would have
been helpful in making difficult decisions does not establish municipal
liability.”).
147. See Commonwealth v. Charles, 992 N.E. 2d 999, 1003–04 (Mass. 2013)
(“In October, 2012, the Chief Justice of the Superior Court assigned specific
judges in seven counties to preside over special ‘drug lab sessions’ . . . . From
October 15 to November 28, the judges presiding over the drug lab sessions held
589 hearings, placing an enormous burden on the Superior Court.”).
148. United States v. Ruiz, 563 U.S. 622 (2002).
149. See id. at 633 (concluding that “the Constitution does not require the
Government to disclose material impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea
agreement with a criminal defendant”). For a discussion of the open issue
whether exculpatory, as opposed to impeachment evidence must be supplied
during plea negotiations, see Samuel R. Wiseman, Waiving Innocence, 96 MINN.
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forensics could be outright concealed from the defense would be
the most unfair imaginable.
Most recently, the West Virginia Supreme Court, surveying
various authorities, concluded that prosecutors are obligated to
provide exculpatory forensic evidence to the defense during plea
negotiations. 150 In Buffey v. Ballard, 151 the State contended that
favorable DNA results, produced in early 2002, need not have
been provided prior to a guilty plea later that year. 152 The
defendant’s lawyer reported having been “desperate” to hear the
results of the DNA testing, but was told that the results were
“not yet complete;” the State had offered Buffey a time-limited
plea offer, and Buffey ultimately accepted it without being told
that the DNA results had excluded him six weeks earlier. 153
While the DNA tests clearly excluded Buffey as either of the
contributors of sperm in a case involving rape, the State
maintained that Buffey would have pleaded guilty regardless,
that the results were not material, and that the results did not
conclusively rule out his involvement. 154 The West Virginia
Supreme Court rejected these contentions, holding none of those
arguments “detract from the exculpatory nature of the evidence
of DNA testing or its materiality.” 155
Brady and Strickland claims can also operate at crosspurposes, and judges have sometimes excused, for example,
prosecutorial misconduct, by arguing that defense lawyers should
have known that forensic evidence was available or unreliable. 156
L. REV. 952, 992 (2012).
150. See Buffey v. Ballard, 782 S.E.2d 204, 216 (W. Va. 2015) (“Having
scrutinized the reasoning of other jurisdictions, this Court finds that the betterreasoned authority supports the conclusion that a defendant is constitutionally
entitled to exculpatory evidence during the plea negotiation stage.”).
151. 782 S.E.2d 204 (W. Va. 2015).
152. See id. at 219–20 (rejecting the State’s argument that because it was
unaware of the status of the DNA testing, it was not in violation of its Brady
obligations because evidence showed the State had been notified of the
exculpatory results prior to the plea).
153. Id. at 208.
154. Id. at 220 (“The State relies heavily upon its assertion that Petitioner
would have pled guilty regardless of any favorable DNA test
results . . . . [Defense counsel] specifically indicated that he would have advised
the Petitioner not to plead guilty if he had obtained the favorable test results.”).
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., John H. Blume & Christopher Seeds, Reliability Matters:
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A better understanding of the ethical obligations on both sides
should mitigate this judge-created Catch-22 situation in which
post-conviction judges excuse the failures of defense lawyers or of
prosecutors by blaming the other lawyers at the expense of the
convict. 157 For broader due process reasons beyond Brady, for
example, the State should be required to accede to defense
requests to provide access to or test forensic evidence, or to
conduct database searches in law enforcement databases to
potentially locate another culprit. 158
C. Fabrication and Forensics
The Supreme Court could also revisit its due process rulings
concerning destruction or fabrication of forensic evidence.
Regarding destruction of evidence, the Court’s Youngblood 159
ruling permits negligent destruction of key forensic evidence, so
long as it was not willful or in “bad faith.” 160 Perhaps the
presentation of false evidence, such as a false assertion by a
forensic analyst on the stand, should support relief under Napue
v. Illinois. 161 Forensic analysts, at least prior to the National
Academy of Sciences Report in 2009, often made unsupported and
false claims on the stand, such as that there was a zero error rate
in conducting latent fingerprint comparisons, or using statistics
to support disciplines for which no statistical research has been
done. False assertions to support forensic conclusions can and
should be more carefully scrutinized under Napue. Some federal
courts have also discussed such claims in the context of civil
§ 1983 lawsuits brought against forensic analysts by wrongful
Reassociating Bagley Materiality, Strickland Prejudice, and Cumulative
Harmless Error, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1153, 1153 (2005) (arguing that
rather than view such class apart or at cross-purposes, “courts should consider
the impact of Brady violations and Strickland violations together when
evaluating whether a guilty verdict or death sentence is reliable”).
157. See Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629,
1664–65 (2008).
158. Regarding division of approaches regarding defense requests for DNA
databank searches, see id. at 1659–60.
159. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988).
160. Id. at 57.
161. 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
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convicted individuals, including DNA exonerees, and sometimes
including both fabrication and Brady v. Maryland claims
together. 162
State courts may have parallel state law standards, and
indeed state courts, including in West Virginia and
Massachusetts have conducted large-scale audits and reopening
of cases tainted by false forensic testimony. 163 State statutes
regarding newly discovered evidence, and statutes addressing
changed scientific understanding, as well as rulings granting
relief based on changed scientific evidence, continue to impact the
way that scientific and forensic evidence is litigated postconviction. State law may play an increasingly important role, as
states like California and Texas enact statutes specifically
designed to permit post-conviction litigation of changed scientific
evidence, where it is not an entirely new technology like a DNA
test that is being used, but rather a change in the understanding
of the reliability of the evidence that supported a criminal
conviction. 164 After all, evidence may not have been litigated
162. See, e.g., Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 739 (6th Cir. 2005)
(explaining that “nontestimonal, pretrial acts” such as falsifying evidence, “do
not benefit from absolute immunity, despite any connection these acts might
have to later testimony”); Atkins v. County of Riverside, 151 Fed. App’x 501,
505–06 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that the fact that an investigator fabricated
evidence during an investigation would “instantly upset the credibility of the
rest of the police investigation” and suppressing such a fact is a “sufficient basis
for a Brady claim”); Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1300 (10th Cir. 2004)
(noting petitioners’ claims that the prosecutor established a policy of using false
evidence and acted with “deliberate indifference to the risk that his
subordinates would introduce false evidence . . . .”); Hunt v. McDade, No. 986808, 2000 WL 219755, at *4 (4th Cir. Feb. 25, 2000) (describing Hunt’s § 1983
Brady-based claims for failure to disclose availability of alternative DNA testing
methods as well as a number of documents); Garrett, Claiming Innocence, supra
note 157, at 1663 (noting that courts are divided on applying Brady in DNA
cases and comparing two cases with similar DNA testing claims that reached
markedly different results).
163. See supra note 147 (discussing special court sessions held to address
problems of inaccurate drug lab testing).
164. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473 (West Supp. 2015) (explaining that “false
evidence” refers to either repudiated expert opinions or evidence that has been
“undermined by later scientific research or technological advances”); TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. ART. 11.073(b), (d) (West 2015) (permitting habeas relief based
on scientific evidence that is currently available that was not available at the
time of trial, and explaining that one factor for consideration is whether
scientific knowledge or methods have changed since the time of trial or previous
applications for habeas relief). For an excellent discussion regarding changes in
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ineffectively, nor may it have been concealed or fabricated, if the
evidence was sound at the time, but subsequent research has
discredited the scientific basis for the conclusions reached. A
better fit for situations like the bullet lead analysis in Kulbicki
may be a due process or state law newly discovered evidence
theory regarding shifted science. 165
While fabrication of evidence remains a viable theory for
relief, the practical challenge if the concern is with the analysis
conducted in the laboratory, is showing that forensic evidence
was purposefully altered. To do so, the defense might need access
to discovery as to the lab reports and the like, to understand the
process that the forensic analysts followed and whether there was
any bad faith handling of evidence. That discovery is often not
provided. Far more important than the Court’s Confrontation
Clause rulings would be a ruling that Brady v. Maryland does not
entitle the defense to the bare fact of an exculpatory forensic
conclusion, but rather the entire set of lab reports and bench
notes and that to meaningfully impeach or confront a lab analyst,
those same materials should be provided if the results are
inculpatory. In contrast, if the fabrication theory relates to errors
in testimony presented on the stand, then showing that false
statements were made may be comparatively straightforward and
based solely on the record.

science and criminal cases, see Jennifer E. Laurin, Criminal Law’s Science Lag:
How Criminal Justice Meets Changed Scientific Understanding, 93 TEX. L. REV.
1751 (2015); see also David S. Mitchell, Jr., Comment, Lock ‘Em Up and Throw
Away the Key: “The West Memphis Three” and Arkansas’s Statute for PostConviction Relief Based on New Scientific Evidence, 62 ARK. L. REV. 501, 531
(2009) (explaining that new forensic testing revealed evidence providing
reasonable doubt about a defendant’s guilt, entitling him to a new trial under
Arkansas law that provided post-conviction relief based on new discoveries in
scientific evidence).
165. For a discussion of this problem, see generally Caitlin M. Plummer and
Imran J. Syed, Shifted Science Revisited: Percolation Delays and the Persistence
of Wrongful Convictions Based on Outdated Science, 64 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 483
(2016); Caitlin Plummer & Imran Syed, “Shifted Science” and Post-Conviction
Relief, 8 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 259 (2012).
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D. Defense Access to Forensics

While the Supreme Court declined to recognize a
freestanding substantive due process post claim seeking defense
access to forensics in Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 166 it is
crucial and well established that the defense must have access to
such evidence before entering a plea agreement or undergoing a
trial. For that reason, the Court should, as many commentators
have suggested, at long last reconsider the application of its
Ake 167 line of cases where the defense is all too routinely denied
access to forensic experts, despite the centrality of forensics to
their case. 168 Over time, as courts better appreciate in which
cases forensics play a central role, courts may also become more
open to considering whether forensics can support and attack to
the sufficiency of the evidence to convict. 169 Due process
sufficiency of the evidence claims are very difficult to prevail
upon, but they should be carefully considered, particularly where
central evidence is implicated.
V. Conclusion
It is not just the interpretation of one area of constitutional
doctrine that has led to the present predicament in which forensic
science is far too little regulated in criminal courts. It is the
interpretation of multiple overlapping areas of criminal
procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has outright reversed course
in its Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and emphasized the
166. 557 U.S. 52 (2009).
167. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
168. See Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance
in a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1305, 1320–24 (2004)
(describing the increase in expert testimony and noting that defense attorneys
“face[] unfamiliar categories of expert knowledge”); see also Caldwell v.
Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323 n.1 (1985) (finding no deprivation of due process
in a decision by the trial judge to deny access to fingerprint and ballistics
experts).
169. See McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 128, 132 (2010) (discussing DNA
evidence and conflicting expert evidence in a conviction for sexual assault); see
also Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2011) (denying relief on a sufficiency of
the evidence claim, but describing disputes in the medical research and calling
“[d]oubts about whether” the defendant is guilty “are understandable”).
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right to confront forensic scientists. Although this may promote
more separation of functions within crime labs and some
improvement in access to analysts on the stand, any effect on the
reliability of forensics is highly attenuated. Far more promising
are the Court’s rulings in the area of the Sixth Amendment and
fair trial right to effective assistance of counsel, which in
combination with due process, and particularly Brady v.
Maryland rulings, may more comprehensively regulate forensics
in the future. Constitutional criminal procedure is not the
primary source for regulating forensics, but as forensics grows in
importance in our criminal justice system, criminal procedure
will increasingly keep pace, as developed in the state and federal
courts and ultimately in the U.S. Supreme Court. After all, both
an effective defense and a sound prosecution hinge on the
accuracy of the evidence used to produce a conviction.

